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BILLS OF PEACE REVISITED
GEORGE B. FRASER*
At common law it was usually impossible to litigate separate claims at
one time even though the claims involved common issues. On the other
hand, the equity court recognized that a multiplicity of suits should be
avoided where there was a relationship between the claims. Therefore, a
bill of peace to prevent separate trials would lie where a number of related
claims were being asserted against a defendant.' Unfortunately, the cases
in this country have not agreed as to the nature of the relationship that
must exist between the claims. Some cases, adopting the view of Professor
Pomeroy,2 have held that a bill of peace will lie where the claims involve
only common questions of law and fact. Other cases hold that the existence of common questions of law and fact is not enough although they
do not agree as to what is necessary. The leading case for this view, which
is probably the majority view, is Tribette v. Illinois Central Railroad.'
However, recent decisions and procedural changes indicate that the
Tribette case should no longer be followed and that courts have the power
to join claims that involve only common questions of law and fact to reduce the time and expense of litigation.
In the Tribette case a number of plaintiffs brought separate actions to
recover damages for the destruction of their property by a fire that was
alleged to have been started by sparks from one of the defendant's engines.
To avoid having to defend a number of suits the defendant Railroad filed
a bill in chancery to enjoin the separate actions and to join the plaintiffs
in one suit, alleging that the various claims arose out of the same occurrence and depended upon the same questions of fact and law. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi held that the Railroad could not bring the claimants
"before a court of chancery in one suit, and deny them their right to
prosecute their actions separately at law as begun by them." 4 Other parts
of the opinion indicate that the court objected to the fact that the plaintiffs
would be deprived of their right to prosecute their actions separately,
rather than that they would be deprived of their right to prosecute their
actions at law. The court stated that its holding was not based on the
fact that the bill had been filed in the wrong court and that even "if we
had only one forum, armed with full power to administer all remedial5
justice; joinder of these parties in one action would not be admissible."
* Boyd Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
I. C.AFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 157-166 (1950); Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 493,
504-508 (1954).
2. 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 269 (5th ed. 1941).
3. 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1892).
4. Id. at 33. The court stated that it had not found any case to support the bill. But see
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 173,
5. Id. at 34.
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Also, the court stated that where diverse injuries are involved separate
suits would be necessary because it would be unthinkable to determine
separate damages in one suit, and even if the damages are the same, such
a bill would not lie because it would be arbitrary to allow it in one case
and not in the other. Therefore, the court held that a bill in equity would
not lie in any case where the claims involved only common questions of
law and fact. Nowhere in the opinion did the court refer to the fact that
a suit in equity would result in the claims being determined by a court
instead of by a jury.
The court stated that a bill of peace would lie where there is some
bther basis for equitable relief, or a common right or title involved, or
a common purpose in pursuit of a common adversary. However, the meaning of these phrases is not clear.6 The court also recognized that where
several persons may sue or be sued in equity their joinder as plaintiffs
permitted.
or as defendants in one suit is'
Ten years later, in Illinois Central Railroad v. Garrison,7 the Supreme
Court of Mississippi held that persons who bring separate actions at law
for damages that result from a continuing trespass may be joined in one
suit in equity and their separate actions at law may be enjoined. In this
action a number of landowners brought separate actions for damages that
were alleged to have been caused by the improper construction of an
embankment. The Railroad, alleging that some of the claimants had
previously brought similar actions and that all of them assert that they
will bring other actions in the future, filed a bill to enjoin the separate
actions and to join the claimants in one suit. The trial court denied the
injunction, but the supreme court reversed. However, jurisdiction in
equity was not based on the ground that the claimants could have joined
as plaintiffs in a suit in equity to abate the nuisance. Instead, it was
based on the ground that if the equity court did not assume jurisdiction
there would be no limit to the number of suits that could be brought
because a continuing trespass was involved. The court stated that "the
jurisdiction of the chancery court to convene all the parties in one suit,
and to determine therein the single question on which liability, past,
present and future depends, so as to prevent this endless multiplicity of
suits, with its attendant useless consumption of time and costs, is too
well settled by modern authorities to be doubted."' The court distinguished the Tribette case on the ground that the claims in that case
arose out of a single past trespass whereas here they arose out of a continuing trespass.
6. In Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 206 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1953),
the court indicates that the Tribette view requires privity between the members of the group.
7. 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996 (1902).
8. Id. at 997.
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In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reaffirmed the
holding in the Garrison case that if numerous actions for damages arise
out of a single past trespass a bill in equity will not lie, but if numerous
actions for damages arise out of a continuing trespass, a bill will lie.' This
distinction is questionable because the right to combine actions that contain common questions should not depend on the nature of the wrong out
of which the claims arose. Where a continuing trespass is involved, future
actions may be brought, but this should not justify the consolidation of
actions for damages that have already accrued where no equitable relief
is requested. Similarly, where a single past trespass is involved, future
claims will not arise, but this should not prevent the consolidation of
actions for damages. In either situation the court should consider if a
determination in one suit of the common question on which liability depends would prevent the useless consumption of time and costs.
Almost sixty years after the Garrison case was decided, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi recognized that separate claims for damages that
arise out of a single past trespass should be determined at one in order to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and save time and costs. In 1959, in Stoner
v. Colvin,10 two persons who were injured in the same automobile collision brought separate suits for damages for personal injuries against the
same defendant. Although Mississippi does not have any statutes on consolidation, the trial court, apparently on its own motion, consolidated the
actions for trial. This was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court held
that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to consolidate
actions "to avoid a multiplicity of suits, to prevent delay, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court, and to save unnecessary costs and expenses."" That the claims involved only common
questions of law and fact and that the damages to each plaintiff were
different did not prevent consolidation. Thus, if the Tribette case were to
arise today, the Railroad's objective could be achieved; it would not
have to defend a multiplicity of suits because the separate actions could
be consolidated.
9. Cumberland T.&T. Co. v. Williamson, 101 Miss. 1, 57 So. 559 (1912). In Gulf &
S.I.R.R. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 48 So. 823 (1909), the court held that the Tribette case had
been overruled. Accord, Whitlock v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R., 91 Miss. 779, 45 So. 861
(1908). However, in the Williamson case the court reaffirmed the Tribette case. In Mississippi
Power Co. v. Ballard, 166 Miss. 631, 146 So. 874 (1933), the Tribette case was cited with
approval. In this case, which involved a permanent nuisance, the court held that a bill
of peace would not lie unless a claimant had brought or had threatened to bring successive
actions. The court did not indicate that if successive actions are brought they must be
brought in bad faith for a bill of peace to lie. For other Mississippi cases see Cnm,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 188; Kimbrough, The Tribette Case, 12 Miss. L.J. 134 (1939).
10. 236 Miss. 736, 110 So. 2d 920 (1959). Accord, Peeples v. Seaboard Airline R.R.,
228 N.C. 590, 46 S.E.2d 649 (1948).
11. 110 So. 2d at 924.
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In other jurisdictions it is generally held that a bill of peace will lie
where a number of suits to enjoin a nuisance and for damages for injuries arising out of the nuisance are brought. 2 But many of these jurisdictions hold that a bill of peace will not lie if the claimants only sue
for damages although the claims arise out of a continuing nuisance.'"
It is often stated that the bill will not lie because it would deprive the
parties of their right to a jury trial. 4 It is surprising how many of these
cases rely on the Tribette case without recognizing that it involved a
completed tort and that in some subsequent decisions the Supreme Court
of Mississippi said that a bill of peace may lie where the actions are for
damages arising out of a continuing nuisance. 5
A few courts hold that a bill of peace may be granted where the separate actions involve only common questions of law and fact although
the only relief requested is damages. In some of these cases it is stated
that if the claim are subsequently found to be valid, the claimants may
continue their separate actions at law for damages.' 6 Thus, the right to a
jury trial on some issues is preserved. Other cases state that if there is
liability, damages may be determined in the same action by a jury.' A
federal court held that a bill of peace should be granted where 130 landowners brought separate suits against a power company for damages for
injury to their property and, if the power company were liable, the question as to the amount of damages to be awarded might, in the discretion
of the court, be submitted to a jury. 8 This would be a desirable result
if it were expanded to include a jury trial on the issue of liability.
In Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 9 a federal court distinguished between jurisdiction in the strict or power sense and jurisdiction in the equity or discretionary sense. It held that a court has the power
to grant a bill of peace where various claims involve common questions of
law and fact, but the court must determine in each case if it should exercise its power. In this case an embankment collapsed causing heavy
damage to agricultural, business and residential property. The owner of
the embankment brought an action in the nature of a bill of peace in which
it alleged that about 2,669 tracts of farm land were flooded, that about
12. E.g., City of Sioux Falls v. Hossack, 69 S.D. 21, 5, N.W.2d 880 (1942).
13. E.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931) (permanent nuisance,
alternative holding). See Annot., 90 A.L.R. 554 (1934) ; 75 A.L.R. 1444 (1931).
14. E.g., Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 173 Ala. 347, 56 So. 198 (1911); Vandalia
Coal Co. v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App. 226, 87 N.E. 47 (1909). In the Kilkeary case, supra note
19, the court remarked that a bill of peace does not deprive parties of their right to a jury
trial because no such right exists where the remedy at law is inadequate.
15. E.g., Ducktown S., C., & I. Co. v. Fain, 109 Tenn. 56, 70 S.W. 813 (1902).
16. Illinois Central R.R. v. Baker, 155 Ky. 512, 159 S.W. 1169 (1913); City of Albert
Lea v. Nielsen, 83 Minn. 246, 86 N.W. 83 (1901).
17. E.g., American Lead Corp. v. Davis, 111 Ind. App. 242, 38 N.E.2d 281 (1941).
18. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. v. Charles, 258 Fed. 723 (M.D. Ala. 1919).
19. 206 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1953).
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8,000 persons were forced from their homes, that other damage was
caused by the flood, and that six actions involving more than 100 claimants
and $853,964.98 in claims had been filed against it. All claimants, including those who had not yet brought suit, were joined as parties to the action,
and the plaintiff asked the court to enjoin all actions against it and to
determine all claims in this action. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded the action with
instructions for the trial court to determine if the remedy at law is plain,
adequate and complete. The court stated that the trial judge should
consider if the action in equity would actually prevent a multiplicity of
litigation, if the parties would benefit by the assumption of jurisdiction,
if the assumption of jurisdiction would obstruct the interests of any
defendant and if the actions could be consolidated at law.
The discussion of the cases indicates that there are two primary objections to granting a bill of peace where the various claims are for damages
arising out of a tort. In the Tribette case the court refused to join all
claimants in one action because it would "deny them their right to prosecute their actions separately at law as begun by them." Other courts have
refused to grant a bill of peace because it would deprive the parties of a
jury trial.
The Stoner case rejected the view that the plaintiff's choice of parties
controls and that neither the defendant nor the court can add other parties
to an action. This is the better view because the plaintiff is not the only
person who is affected by the litigation. The defendant, the witnesses; the
jurors and the court are necessarily involved, and the proper administration of justice requires the court to see that the interests of these persons
are protected. Where the plaintiff will not be prejudiced, his right to
prosecute his separate action without other persons being made parties
must yield to the interest of the defendant, the witnesses, the jurors and
the court in decreasing the burden of litigation by reducing the number
of suits."0 Therefore, the view that the plaintiff's action cannot be expanded has passed into oblivion with many other common law concepts,
and modern statutes and rules of procedure contain numerous provisions
for the joinder of claims and the consolidation of actions.
In most jurisdictions statutes or court rules permit persons whose claims
arise out of one transaction or occurrence, and involve common questions
of law or fact, to join in one action as plaintiffs. 1 Joinder is optional with
20. See Twelfth Annual Report, New York Judicial Council 167 (1946).
21. E.g., FED. R. CIV. PROC. 20. See Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682
(1924), where 193 claimants with separate causes of action joined as plaintiffs in one suit.
The existence of common questions of law or fact should be sufficient, and the requirement
that the claims arise out' of one transaction or occurrence should be deleted from Federal
Rule 20. Blume, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims and Counterclaims, The Judicial Administration Monographs 41, 46 (A.B.A. 1942). The unfortunate effect of the requirement that the

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 4:419

the plaintiffs, however, rather than with the defendant although the
defendant is the party who would be vexed by a multiplicity of suits if the
claims are not joined. Other claimants may intervene.2 2 Also, a plaintiff
may join as defendants persons who may be liable to him either jointly,
severally or in the alternative, where their liability arises out of one
transaction or occurrence and involves common questions of law or fact.3
The defendant may assert a claim against the plaintiff or a co-defendant
if his claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the basis
of the plaintiff's action,2 4 and the defendant may assert a claim against
a new party for contribution or indemnity,2" although he may not implead
a third party to recover damages for his own injuries.2 6 Nevertheless,
modern rules of procedure do not provide defendants the same freedom
of joinder that is available to plaintiffs. Although a defendant may be
harassed by a multiplicity of suits that arise out of some transaction or
occurrence, the rules do not authorize him to implead the persons who
are asserting claims against him so that the single question on which
liability depends may be determined in one action. 7 Since the claimants
could have joined as plaintiffs, impleader should be allowed. The action
would be no more difficult to try where the claimants are brought in by
the defendant then where they voluntarily join as parties.
In addition to authorizing the joinder of claims, modern statutes and
rules of procedure permit a court to consolidate actions that are pending
before it for a joint trial of some or all of the issues where consolidation
28
would avoid a multiplicity of trials and would not prejudice any party.
Where actions can be consolidated, a bill of peace will not be allowed. 9
However, the provisions which permit consolidation will not always
prevent a defendant from being harassed by a multiplicity of suits,3 °
claims must arise out of the same transaction is illustrated by Stanford v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 18 F.R.D. 152 (M.D. Tenn. 1955). See Note, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1965).

22. E.g., Fan. R. CIv. PROC. 24(b).
23. E.g., FEn. R. CIV. PROC. 20.
24. E.g., FED. R. Civ. Paoc.. 13.
25. E.g., FaD. R. CIv. PRoc. 14.
26. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33
F.R.D. 27, 39 (1963). Such joinder is allowed in Oklahoma. OK.TA. STAT. tit. 12, § 323 (Supp.
1963).
27. Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 229 N.C. 397, 50 S.E.2d 45 (1948).
28. E.g., FED. R. CIV. PROC. 42(a), Hotel George V v. McLean, 1 F.R.D. 241 (D.D.C.
1940) (consolidate for trial of one issue) ; Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1959). In Shacter v.
Richter, 135 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1965), the consolidation of two separate suits by one
plaintiff against different defendants for injuries arising out of two separate occurrences
was upheld because there was a common question as to damages. After consolidation, some
issues may be separated for trial. Kelly v. Greer, 295 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1961).
29. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Wert, 102 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1939).
30. American Lead Corp. v. Davis, 111 Ind. App. 242, 38 N.E.2d 281 (1941); C.ArEE,
SOME PROBLEM-aS OF EQUTY 155 (1950).
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because generally, actions that are pending in different courts cannot be
consolidated,"' and consolidation is not available where the claimants have
not filed suit.
Where there are numerous claimants, a few courts permit a potential
defendant to bring an action for a declaration that he is not liable for
conduct which is asserted to be tortious. 2 However, an action for declaratory relief is not adequate unless the court also enjoins the prosecution of
pending actions and the commencement of new ones.
Since the provisions for the joinder of claims and the consolidation of
actions do not fully protect a defendant from being harassed by a multiplicity of suits on claims that involve common questions of law or fact, a
bill of peace to enjoin the separate suits and require the claimants to assert
their claims in one action should lie. However, the parties should not be
deprived of their right to a jury trial.
In a jurisdiction that has merged its courts of law and equity an
action does not have to be deemed to be an equitable action for all purposes. The court could use its equity power to enjoin the separate actions
and to require all claimants to assert their claims in one suit, but the action
could be deemed to be legal action for the trial on the merits." This would
preserve the advantage of an action at law-the right to a jury trial-and
the advantage of a suit in equity-the prevention of a multiplicity of
actions by determining liability in one suit.
A similar approach has been taken by a few courts in interpleader actions. Although interpleader is traditionally an equitable action, the dispute between the claimants has been tried by a jury. 4 In one case the court
31. Anschell v. Sackheim, 145 F. Supp. 447 (D.N.J. 1956). Some statutes permit the
consolidation of actions that are pending in different courts. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 602(b) (1963),
Lee v. Schmeltzer, 229 App. Div. 206, 242 N.Y. Supp. 34 (1930); WIs. STAT. § 269.59
(1957), Keplin v. Hardward Mut. Cas. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 319, 129 N.W.2d 321 (1964).
32. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Taylor, 87 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Mo. 1949) (defendants
counterclaimed for damages); State v. Adelmeyer, 221 Wis. 246, 265 N.W. 838 (1936).
Where only one claimant is involved, courts, as a matter of discretion, usually refuse to
hear an action for a declaration that plaintiff's conduct was not tortious. Sun Oil Co. v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 108 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d
957 (3d Cir. 1953); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Bullock, 181 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1950). In several
cases the court took jurisdiction although the question was not discussed. Standard Brands
v. Bryce, 1 Cal. 2d 718, 37 P.2d 446 (1934); Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La.
796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953).
33. Cf. Washington Water Power Co. v. Crane, 40 Idaho 310, 233 Pac. 878 (1925);
Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (1916); Midland Valley R.R. v. Imler, 101
Okla. 298, 225 Pac. 919 (1924). In the federal courts a jury trial would be required. Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 259 U.S. 500 (1959).
34. Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 483 (E.D. La. 1960);
Burton v. Ott, 226 Ky. 647, 11 S.W.2d 700 (1928); Barnett v. Greenfield, 294 Mass. 148,
1 N.E.2d 11 (1936); Burnett v. Amicable Life Ins. Co., 195 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946); Harrington, Jury Trial in Interpleader, 39 TaxAs L. Rav. 632 (1961).
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stated that the equitable remedy of interpleader is available for the protection of the stakeholder, and after the court finds that the stakeholder has a
right to interpleader, the basic nature of the issue between the claimants
should control the right to a trial by jury.85 Similarly, a bill of peace
should prevent a person from being oppressed by a number of actions that
involve the same facts and legal issues, but after the court grants the
bill, the nature of the issues between the parties should determine the
method of trial.
Modern rules of procedure permit a court to order separate trials of
specific issues, such as liability and damages.8 6 Thus, after granting a bill
of peace, a court could separate the issue of liability from the issue of
damages and determine the common issue of liability at one time for all
claimants. 7 Then, if the alleged tortfeasor is found to be liable and the
claims are so numerous that the evidence may be confusing, the court may
separate the damage claims for trial. Even persons who oppose the separation of liability and damages for trial where only one plaintiff and one
defendant are involved, recognize that separating the issues is desirable
where there are multiple parties.38
The holding in the Kilkeary case that a court has the power to enjoin
the prosecution of separate suits where the claims involve common questions of law and fact, and that the court must consider the effect that a
single trial of the various claims may have on the parties in order to determine if it should exercise its power, is a desirable rule and should be
followed in other jurisdictions. If a-saving of time and cost will result from
trying the issue of liability at one time, and if no one will be prejudiced
by a single trial, a bill of peace should be granted. Moreover, it should
be immaterial whether the claims arose out of a past trespass or a continuing nuisance. Adoption of this rule would make it unnecessary to
distinguish between a community of interest, a common right or title,
a common interest, etc. Bills of peace would then become a useful
procedure for simplifying the litigation arising from a mass tort.39 How-

ever, if a court grants a bill of peace, the parties should be entitled to
a jury trial of all issues.
Stare decisis should not apply to rules of procedure.40 Therefore, courts
35. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 119 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. Ala. 1954).
36. E.g., FED. R. CIV. PROC. 20(b), 21, 42(b), Nettles v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assur. Corp., 234 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1956).
37. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Taylor, 87 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
38. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule-Making Power, 14 VAnD. L. REV. 831, 840 (1961).
39. Some claimants could not be joined because they are beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, but only the claimants who are joined will be affected by the action. See Comment,
ProceduralDevices For Simplifying Litigation Stemming From Mass Tort, 63 YALE L.J. 493,
507-509 (1954).
40. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814, 838-839 (1921).
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which have limited the usefulness of bills of peace should reexamine their
restrictions in light of the principle that actions for damages which involve
common questions of fact should be tried at one time where no one will
be prejudiced thereby, and the procedural developments that permit
courts to grant legal and equitable relief in the same action and to separate
for trial the issues of liability and damages. Also, statutes and rules of
procedure should be amended to include a provision that would authorize
a defendant to join in one action, persons who assert claims against him
that involve common questions of fact. The provision should state that the
basic nature of the issues involved will determine the method of trial.

